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NATURE AND PAGANISM IN HARDY'S *TESS OF THE D'URBERVILLES*

BY CHARLOTTE BONICA

In May, 1877, Thomas Hardy observed of himself, "I sometimes look upon all things in inanimate Nature as pensive mutes." And, nearly twenty years later, he confessed, "In spite of myself I cannot help noticing countenances and tempers in objects of scenery."¹ The same tendency to imbue nature with human qualities characterizes a well-known description of an August dawn in *Tess of the D'Urbervilles*:

The sun, on account of the mist, had a curious sentient, personal look, demanding the masculine pronoun for its adequate expression. His present aspect, coupled with the lack of all human forms in the scene, explained the old-time heliolatries in a moment. One could feel that a saner religion had never prevailed under the sky. The luminary was a golden-haired, beaming, mild-eyed, God-like creature, gazing down in the vigour and intentness of youth upon an earth that was brimming with interest for him.²

The impulse that Hardy perceived in himself and that characterizes this passage—the tendency to perceive sentience in an inanimate environment, and particularly in nature—arises, in Hardy's view, from an innate and inescapable human need to make sense of the universe in humanly understandable terms, a need that ran counter to Hardy's own intellectual understanding of things.

Hardy invests his characters, particularly those in his later novels, with the same inexorable need to discover in the universe a moral significance and a system of value capable of replacing the traditional orthodoxies that no longer satisfy them. Angel Clare, having rejected the "untenable redemptive theolatriy" of his parents' faith (153), arrives at Talbothays Dairy suffering from what Hardy calls "the ache of modernism," what David DeLaura has described as "the distress and rootlessness of those whose intellectual honesty forces them to live without a sense of Providence."³ At Talbothays Angel seems to find a satisfying alternative to Chris-

tianity in the “pagan” existence of the “summer-steeped heathens in the Var Vale” (197-98):

Latterly he had seen only Life, felt only the great passionate pulse of existence, unwarped, uncontroverted, untrammelled by those creeds which futilely attempt to check what wisdom would be content to regulate.

(199)

Life at Talbothays seems to Angel more closely attuned to the natural world, and hence, more nearly suited to human desire than the life he has known before. More important, it seems to bear out his notion “that it might have resulted far better for mankind if Greece had been the source of the religion of modern civilization, and not Palestine” (199).

At the heart of the country people’s paganism is the tendency to see congruence between events and situations in their own lives, and phenomena in the natural world: the dairy workers account for the failure of the butter to come by surmising the presence of lovers in the dairy (172); they interpret the cock’s crow on the afternoon of Tess’s wedding as a bad omen (257-58). Tess herself, in spite of her Christian training, peoples the natural world with projections of her own imagination and emotions.

Angel, of course, never subscribes to the country superstitions, never deliberately adopts the rural consciousness that animates nature with human forms and human qualities. Yet he does begin to make

close acquaintance with phenomena which he had before known but darkly—the seasons in their moods, morning and evening, night and noon, winds in their different tempers, trees, waters and mists, shades and silences, and the voices of inanimate things.

(157)

This passage immediately follows the statement that at Talbothays Angel has become “wonderfully free from the chronic melancholy which is taking hold of the civilized races with the decline of belief in a beneficent Power” (156). The implication is that, in the pagan attitude toward the natural world, Angel begins to discover a new source of value and a replacement for the exhausted creed of his parents’ faith—a new way of making sense of a universe bereft of Providence.

Hardy’s sympathy for Angel is clear: it is the sympathy of one

whose own intellectual conclusions prevented him from belief in any sort of Providence, but who, late in life, described himself as “churchy; not in an intellectual sense, but insofar as instincts and emotions ruled” (*Life*, 376). Hardy understood the impulse to seek meanings and Providential designs in existence. He also understood the uneasiness and pain of “advanced” individuals who could no longer find such meanings in traditional orthodoxies. Yet Hardy shows that Angel’s solution, a kind of vague and unexamined neopaganism, proves not only illusory, but dangerous. In enshrining Tess in his pagan pantheon as “a fresh and virginal daughter of Nature” (158), Angel turns her into a symbol of a way of life and a system of values, and ultimately plays an important role in her destruction.

In comparison to Hardy’s harsh treatment of Angel’s neopaganism, his treatment of the rural pagans is sympathetic. Indeed, the fact that many of their superstitions, like the two cited above, prove correct suggests that for them paganism is, in Hardy’s view, an appropriate way of comprehending existence. But because their culture is circumscribed by the encroachment of civilization, their paganism is powerless. Like the genteel evangelicalism of the elder Clares, whom he also renders in a sympathetic light, their creed is dying. Though Stonehenge remains as a reminder of its past brutality, paganism is no longer powerful enough, except in the hands of a neopagan like Angel, to effect real harm. Indeed, Hardy portrays the country pagans, including Tess herself, with such sympathy that critics have argued that his intention in *Tess* is to suggest that the pagan relationship with nature offers modern individuals a useful replacement for Christianity.

Those who do so fail to see that in *Tess* every ascription of human qualities to natural objects, every perception of moral meaning in natural phenomena, is qualified and rendered unauthoritative. Most such passages describe not nature itself, but the response to nature of some character or implied observer. For example, the atmosphere in the Talbothays garden during Tess’s first encounter with Angel is “in such delicate equilibrium and so transmissive that inanimate objects *seemed* endowed with two or three senses, if not five” (161). And later the hot weather of July “*seemed* an effort on the part of Nature to match the state of hearts at Talbothays Dairy” (189; emphasis added in both quotations).

Bruce Johnson has recently argued that, though Hardy discounts the validity of Angel’s neopaganism, the rural paganism that Tess

unconsciously espouses represents a positive standard in the novel: “Hardy seems to associate the ability to be in touch with primeval pagan meanings with the ability to be in touch with the emotional, primitive sources of one’s own being.”⁴ Using the “heliolatry” passage cited above as a basis for his argument, Johnson claims,

Hardy implies that Christianity’s capacity for creating guilt is unfortunate and that the old heliolatry had no such intent—that it must have been in this regard an unusually sane religion. Unlike Hardy’s usual conception of deities, the sun-god finds earth “brimming with interest for him.”⁵

Johnson overlooks the fact that the sun appears a beneficent deity because of the presence of the mist, a distorting medium that functions throughout *Tess* as a signal of moral or intellectual confusion. (Tess is seduced on a misty night; the morning mist encourages Angel’s dangerous illusions about her.) Furthermore, Johnson fails to see as significant the phrase “one could see that,” which implies the presence of an interpreting observer. What Hardy is saying here is that the appearance of the sun—distorted by the mist—makes it possible to understand the pagan impulse to perceive it in an anthropomorphic and beneficent deity. The old “heliolatries” may seem saner, may even seem to have a more understandable basis in the appearance of things. Hardy may even be implying that, in comparison with Christianity, paganism may represent an ethic more nearly suited to human desire. But for all that, paganism, in whatever form, is nevertheless based on the impossible premise that the natural world can function as a source of human value.

Moreover, the pagan perception of nature as alive with meaning to humans can be a double-edged sword. Although at times nature seems to reinforce human joy, it can also intensify human sorrow. If Tess can feel on her way to Talbothays that

her hopes mingled with the sunshine in an ideal photosphere which surrounded her as she bounded along against the soft south wind. She heard a pleasant voice in every breeze, and in every bird’s note seemed to lurk a joy,

(140)

she can also feel, after hearing the story of Jack Dollop, who refused to marry the woman he had seduced, that

the evening sun was now ugly to her, like a great inflamed wound in the sky. Only a solitary cracked-voiced reed-sparrow greeted her from the bushes by the river, in a sad, machine-made

tone, resembling that of a past friend whose friendship she had outworn.

(174-75)

And later, oppressed by the conflict between her wish to accept Angel's proposal of marriage and her scruples against doing so, she sees in the setting sun

a great forge in the heavens, and presently a monstrous pumpkin-like moon arose on the other hand. The pollard willows, tortured out of their natural shape by incessant choppings, became spiny-haired monsters as they stood up against it.

(219)

Hence, although the sun may sometimes seem a beneficent deity, it can sometimes seem also to heighten human experience of suffering and sorrow. Worse, the natural world seems at times to be animated with a consciousness antipathetic to Tess's situation. After her liaison with Alec, during her evening walks,

her whimsical fancy would intensify natural processes around her till they seemed a part of her own story. Rather they became part of it, for the world is a psychological phenomenon, and what they seemed they were. . . . A wet day was the expression of irremediable grief at her weakness in the mind of some vague ethical being whom she could not class definitely as the God of her childhood, and could not comprehend as any other.

(120)

Although Tess's sense of guilt and her conception of a disapproving deity may be derived from conventional morality and traditional Christianity, her ascription of a disapproving consciousness to the natural world is entirely pagan. In short, she is a victim as much of her paganism as of her Christian training. And Hardy is quick to dismiss her sense of guilt as based on illusion:

She looked upon herself as a figure of Guilt intruding into the haunts of Innocence. But all the while she was making a distinction where there was no difference. Feeling herself in antagonism, she was quite in accord. She had been made to break an accepted social law, but no law known to the environment in which she fancied herself such an anomaly.

(121)

Citing this passage in support of his argument that in *Tess* pagan attitudes toward nature represent a valid model for human values, Johnson argues,

Tess animates Nature with an attitude or mood that is antipathetic to it: she feels she is “guilty” and that Nature is “innocent.” But, says Hardy, both she *and* Nature are innocent. . . . Although she creates the world of Nature as a psychological phenomenon, the passage suggests that there is a more “real” Nature that her psychological perceptions cannot touch, a Nature not susceptible to judgments of guilt that must be called innocent.⁶

The truth is that when Hardy says that Tess is “in accord” with nature, he is merely saying that her sexuality, rather than separating her from the natural world, actually represents her connection to it. Her mistake consists not in her perception of a moral distinction between herself and the natural world, but in her ascription to nature, in the first place, of any morality at all.

The point is that human notions of innocence and guilt are entirely irrelevant in nature. When Tess feels guilty in comparison with nature, she is wrong, not because she, like nature, is actually innocent, but because in the natural world innocence and guilt are not at issue. Judging Tess and nature according to Christian values renders both guilty. Judging Tess and nature according to pagan values renders them both innocent. But Hardy’s point is that both value systems are simply irrelevant in the natural world. Contrary to Johnson’s conclusion, nature is neither innocent nor guilty, except insofar as it functions as a “psychological phenomenon” animated by the pagan impulse to perceive meaning in it. In itself, nature is devoid of moral significance.

For Hardy, nature operates according to laws that are not only independent of but at times at odds with human desire and the human sense of order. Its indifference to human suffering is clear in the episode in which Tess and her brother transport the bees to Casterbridge. It is Tess who ascribes a kind of moral order to the stars, imagining some as “blighted” and some as “sound.” The stars themselves shine “amid the black hollows above, in serene dissociation from these two wisps of human life” (59). Nature is clearly indifferent to human notions of worldly distinction. At Talbothays, the sun casts against the barn wall the

shadows of these obscure and homely figures [the dairy workers] every evening with as much care over each contour as if it had been the profile of a court beauty on a palace wall; copied them as diligently as it had copied Olympian shades on marble *façades* long ago, or the outline of Alexander, Caesar, and the Pharaohs.

(142)

More important, the sun beats indifferently upon individuals without regard for moral distinctions. Even the country pagan Tess wonders “why the sun do shine on the just and the unjust alike” (165).

In fact, an essential quality of the natural world is the absolute absence from it of any moral value. It comprises myriad dynamic and urgent forces, indifferent not only to human life, but indeed to its own individual components:

The season developed and matured. Another year’s instalment of flowers, leaves, nightingales, thrushes, finches, and such ephemeral creatures, took up their positions where only a year ago others had stood in their place when these were nothing more than germs and inorganic particles.

(168)

There is in Hardy criticism a long tradition that argues that the *summum bonum* in Hardy’s universe is the life lived “in tune” with nature. Gabriel Oak and Diggory Venn are often cited as examples of individuals who live such lives successfully and, for the most part, contentedly. Characters like Bathsheba, Farmer Boldwood, Eustacia, and Clym make the mistake, in this view, of failing to acknowledge the supremacy of nature; consequently, they remain unhappy until and unless they learn to do so. John Holloway, the most distinguished and persuasive proponent of this position, says, “The single abstraction which does most to summarize Hardy’s view is simple enough: *it is right to live naturally*. . . . To live naturally is to live in continuity with one’s whole biological environment.”⁷

Holloway bases his argument in large part on Hardy’s use of metaphor—his tendency to describe humans in terms from the natural world, and to see in the natural world human qualities. He cites, for example, a passage from *The Woodlanders* that “contains no less than ten metaphors. All of them do something to reinforce the impression that Nature has a quasi-human life.”⁸ He lists a number of comparisons of humans to animals, stating that among other things these metaphors “suggest a continuity between man and Nature.”⁹ Holloway concludes, “the ultimate effect of deliberately confusing human and natural in this way is to make them seem, in essence, one and the same.”¹⁰ Similarly, John Paterson has more recently argued that Hardy’s use of such metaphors makes “people in novels . . . functions of wholly natural values and conditions . . . participants in some larger nonhuman drama.”¹¹ In each

case the critic has drawn a moral conclusion from what is, for Hardy, an essentially aesthetic technique.

One of Holloway's statements echoes a passage from Hardy's notebooks—an observation prompted by Edward Clodd's answer to Hardy's query about the similarities between the superstitions of “a remote Asiatic and a Dorset labourer”:

“The attitude of man,” he says, “at corresponding levels of culture, before like phenomena, is pretty much the same, your Dorset peasants representing the persistence of the barbaric idea that confuses persons and things, and founds wide generalizations on the slenderest analogies.”

(This “barbaric idea which confuses persons and things” is, by the way, also common to the highest imaginative genius—that of the poet.)

(*Life*, 230)

Hardy's ironically amused observation—which is dated December 1890, shortly after he had completed the adaptation of *Tess* for serial publication—suggests that his use of metaphors that “confuse” the human and the natural is a function of his artistic, not moral, vision.

In an earlier notebook entry, Hardy pondered the question of the portrayal of nature in art:

So then, if Nature's defects must be looked in the face and transcribed, whence arises the *art* in poetry and novel-writing? which must certainly show art, or it becomes merely mechanical reporting. I think the art lies in making these defects the basis of a hitherto unperceived beauty, by irradiating them with “the light that never was” on their surface, but is seen to be latent in them by the spiritual eye.

(*Life*, 114)

That Hardy is here thinking of “defects” that are moral rather than aesthetic is suggested by his use of a phrase from Wordsworth's “Elegaic Stanzas.” In the poem the poet ponders the question, raised by his brother's death at sea, of nature's cruelty. Before that event, the poet would have cast upon an imagined seascape “the gleam, / The light that never was on sea or land, / The consecration, and the Poet's dream.”¹²

Hardy's decision to make “Nature's defects . . . the basis of a hitherto unperceived beauty” represents a decision to portray nature not in terms of humanly conceived notions of moral value, but

in purely aesthetic terms; by seeing them not with the eye of the moralist, but with that of the poet.

In 1890, Hardy wrote in his journal,

Art is the changing of the actual proportions and order of things, so as to bring out more forcibly than might otherwise be done that feature in them which appeals most strongly to the idiosyncrasy of the artist.

(*Life*, 228)

Hardy's own self-confessed "idiosyncrasy," as the passages quoted at the beginning of this paper suggest, was to emphasize the apparent likenesses he perceived between human life and the natural world. His metaphors, therefore, may "confuse" human and natural for aesthetic reasons, but they are not intended to suggest a moral connection between man and nature.

Paterson's awed response to Hardy's use of metaphors from nature blinds him to the larger moral issues of *Tess*. His claim that "to Hardy, Nature . . . was what his Angel Clare would call 'actualized poetry'" ignores the unconscious irony in Angel's words—Angel sees Tess not as she is, but as a figure in a Romantic poem celebrating rural simplicity. Paterson celebrates the "transfigurations" of the country folk on their walk home from the Chaseborough dance, without taking into account the larger implications of the situation—the country folk, immersed in an alcoholic dream of "at oneness" with nature, are soon to begin the fracas from which Tess is forced to escape into Alec's arms. Paterson fails to see that the mist that settles on Tess's hair like seed pearls serves to reinforce Angel's tendency to see Tess not as she is, but as a goddess.¹³

In short, by failing to notice "how Hardy's nature similes function fictionally,"¹⁴ Paterson begs important questions raised in *Tess*. By claiming that Hardy makes his characters not "functions of their merely social values and conditions[,] . . . participants in a merely human drama," but instead "functions of wholly natural values and conditions[,] . . . participants in some larger nonhuman drama," Paterson ignores, first, that Hardy's characters, and Tess in particular, are indeed participants in a concrete social system; second, that there are no such things in Hardy's universe as "wholly natural values," because there are no values in nature, except those imagined by humans; and third, that, though nature itself may be a "larger nonhuman drama," the introduction of humans into it must necessarily introduce "social values and conditions."

The interpretation offered by both critics—explicitly by Holloway, implicitly by Paterson—is that since the natural world is grander than human life, since in a sense it supersedes human life, man ought to seek lessons in how to live from nature, lessons that in effect are moral. It is true that in Hardy’s universe nature supersedes human life in a purely biological sense, but nature can never entirely satisfy the human need to find value and moral meaning in existence. It is, in fact, man’s moral nature that distinguishes him from the natural world and that unfits him to find satisfaction in a universe devoid of humanly understandable notions of justice, morality, and value. Hence, Hardy’s often-quoted lament, recorded in his notebooks during his work on *Tess*:

A woeful fact—that the human race is too extremely developed for its corporeal conditions, the nerves being evolved to an activity abnormal in such an environment. . . . It may be questioned if Nature, or what we call Nature, so far back as when she crossed the line from invertebrates to vertebrates, did not exceed her mission. This planet does not supply the materials for happiness to higher existences.

(*Life*, 218)

In a letter that appeared in the May 17, 1902, issue of *The Academy and Literature* and was reprinted in the *Life*, Hardy responded to a published review of Maeterlinck’s *Apology for Nature*. Hardy takes exception to the reviewer’s “approval [of Maeterlinck’s] vindication of Nature’s ways, which is (as I understand it) to the effect that, though she does not appear to be just from our point of view, she may practise a scheme of morality unknown to us, in which she is just.” Hardy goes on to expose the “sophistry” in Maeterlinck’s argument:

Pain has been, and pain is: no new sort of morals in Nature can remove pain from the past and make it pleasure for those who are its infallible estimators, the bearers thereof. And no injustice, however slight, can be atoned for by her future generosity, however ample, so long as we consider Nature to be, or to stand for, unlimited power.

Hardy agrees with Maeterlinck only in his conclusion, “that to model our conduct on Nature’s apparent conduct . . . can only bring disaster to humanity” (*Life*, 314-15).

The “continuity” that Holloway sees, the human participation in “some larger nonhuman drama” that Paterson sees, do exist in a

limited way; but the continuity is not moral. Human values, human desires, human distinctions between good and evil are, as Tess sometimes notices, entirely irrelevant in nature. To argue that the natural world could, in any sense, provide man with any principle of moral order is to ignore the profound moral *discontinuity* between man and nature.

The one particularly exigent connection between man and nature is that of sexuality. Like other natural forces, the sexual impulse is essentially amoral; it influences human destiny without regard for human notions of appropriateness. In *Tess* especially, Hardy dramatizes its effect on human life:

Amid the oozing fatness and warm ferments of the Froom Vale, at a season when the rush of juices could almost be heard below the hiss of fertilization, it was impossible that the most fanciful love should not grow passionate. The ready bosoms existing there were impregnated by their surroundings.

(189)

It is quite significant that the metaphor in the last sentence is clearly sexual. The only real “continuity” between man and nature consists in nature’s “impregnation” of the sexual impulse into human life.

Holloway’s often sound discussion of nature itself in Hardy’s fiction does not take into account the pervasiveness, especially in the later novels, of sexuality throughout nature. Thus, he fails to notice that a number of the metaphors he sees as reinforcing the idea of “continuity” between man and nature occur in situations charged with sexuality. He points out, for example, a passage from *The Woodlanders* that describes the affection between Grace and Fitzpiers as growing “as imperceptibly as the twigs budded on the trees.” He notices in *Tess* the notion that Tess and Angel are “converging, under an irresistible law, as surely as two streams in one vale.” He cites the garden scene in which Tess listens to Angel’s harp “like a fascinated bird.” But he fails to notice that the natural metaphors in these passages are particularly significant in view of Hardy’s conviction that natural forces and human life converge only in the human sexual impulse.¹⁵

Holloway’s formula, “It is right to live naturally,” though perhaps appropriate to Hardy’s earlier novels, is no longer sufficient in the universe of *Tess* precisely because “to live in continuity with one’s whole biological . . . environment” would mean to surrender to the

force of sexuality. Apart from moral objections to such a way of life, the issue is complicated by human choice in such matters, by human emotions, and by human notions of value. Indeed, Holloway undermines his own argument with the statement,

The people whom Hardy presents in an altogether sympathetic light are like Gabriel Oak, Diggory Venn and Giles Winterbourne—all solid sterling characters completely satisfied with their position in life and at one with it. Their only misfortunes are in love.¹⁶

Love, a wholly human emotion, is precisely what bars these characters from living out Holloway's dictum. And Hardy's point is that human emotions and human values make it impossible to "live naturally." By the time of *Tess*, he shows that such a way of life is impossible not only for the modern individual like Angel, but indeed for Tess herself, easily the most "natural" character, by Holloway's definition, in Hardy's fiction. Even the dairymaids, whom Holloway describes as "resigned to disappointments[,] . . . taking it for granted that Angel will not marry one of them,"¹⁷ suffer acutely from the intransigence of their sexual impulses:

The air of the sleeping-chamber seemed to palpitate with the hopeless passion of the girls. They writhed feverishly under the oppressiveness of an emotion thrust upon them by cruel Nature's law—an emotion which they had neither expected nor desired. . . . The differences which distinguished them as individuals were abstracted by this passion, and each was but portion of one organism called sex.

(187)

To live as these women do in the midst of natural processes means to feel acutely the inescapable influence of the sexual force, which operates without regard for human feelings. In their case, it means also to suffer acutely the thwarting of their sexual impulses by the restraints imposed not only by conventional morality, but also by the realities of human emotions. That is, even without conventional moral restraints, these women would suffer because they prefer above other men Angel Clare, who himself prefers Tess above them. In his notebook Hardy says, "Emotions have no place in a world of defect" (149), and in *Tess* he dramatizes the statement vividly with the plight of the dairymaids.

Holloway seems to forget that after Angel marries Tess, Retty attempts suicide, Marion seeks another sort of oblivion in alcohol,

and Izz sinks into a deep depression. The point is that, far from providing human life with moral significance, the natural world, particularly through its inexorable sexual force, displays cruelty and injustice.

The idea that nature in Hardy's fiction is fraught with moral meaning is common. As I have suggested, this view springs from the failure to take into account a shift in Hardy's attitudes. The earlier novels reveal a pastoralism that, though qualified, seems to illustrate the superiority of the simplicities of the rural state of mind over the complexities of the modern consciousness. Even *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* reveals a deep regret over the passing of the rural culture. Yet however nostalgic Hardy feels about the death of country life, he does not suggest that its central, though unconscious, attitudes toward nature—its paganism—can realistically provide a balm for “the ache of modernism.”

Angel Clare's freedom from this “ache” is brief. As soon as he realizes that Tess is not the goddess he has imagined her to be, the fragile construct of his neopaganism collapses. Hardy invites his reader to condemn Angel's cruelty to Tess, but he also reveals an acute understanding of Angel's need to find values that can make sense of existence. Indeed, the self-conscious, almost sheepish, tone of the second of the two notebook entries cited at the opening of this paper suggests Hardy's awareness of the persistence, after twenty years, of the impulse in himself to imbue with meaning a morally vacuous universe.

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FOOTNOTES

¹ Florence Emily Hardy, *The Life of Thomas Hardy, 1840-1928* (1928, 1930; rpt. London: Macmillan, 1962), pp. 114, 285 (second quotation, 10 Feb. 1897). Subsequent quotations from the *Life* are taken from this edition.

² *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* (1891; rpt. London: Macmillan, The New Wessex Edition, 1974), p. 122. Subsequent quotations from *Tess* are taken from this edition.

³ “The Ache of Modernism’ in Hardy's Later Novels,” *ELH*, 34 (1967), 380-99.

⁴ “The Perfection of Species’ and Hardy's Tess” in *Nature and the Victorian Imagination*, ed. U. C. Knoepfelmacher and G. B. Tennyson (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1977), pp. 259-77.

⁵ Johnson, p. 262.

⁶ Johnson, pp. 261-62.

⁷ “Hardy” in his *The Victorian Sage: Studies in Argument* (1953; rpt. New York: Norton, 1965), pp. 245-89.

⁸ Holloway, p. 257.

⁹ Holloway, p. 270.

¹⁰ Holloway, p. 267.

¹¹ "Lawrence's Vital Source: Nature and Character in Hardy" in *Nature and the Victorian Imagination* (n. 2, above), pp. 455-69.

¹² *Wordsworth: Poetical Works*, ed. Thomas Hutchinson, rev. Ernest de Selincourt (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 452-53, ll. 15-16.

¹³ Paterson, pp. 456, 465.

¹⁴ David J. DeLaura, "Nature Naturing: Literary Natural History," *Victorian Studies*, 22 (Winter, 1979).

¹⁵ Holloway, p. 269.

¹⁶ Holloway, p. 282.

¹⁷ Holloway, p. 283.